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Abstract
In this paper the individual optimal level of education is set in a frictional labor
market, where matching is not perfect. Also search frictions are a function of the average
education of the labor force. Therefore, an increase in the average education can improve
economic e¢ ciency, not only through improvements in workers productivity, but also
making the matching process more e¢ cient, and thus reducing the unemployment level.
Keywords: Education, Externalities, Search, Matching, Unemployment
JEL classi￿cation: I21, J41, J64
1. Introduction
In modern economies, a large portion of human capital investments takes place
in the form of education. While the main contributions of the role of education
to economic outcomes are mainly in its importance to economic growth or to ex-
plain wage inequality, little has been done to understand how education choices
interact with wage and unemployment determination in a frictional labor mar-
ket, where matching is not perfect. As noted by Holzer (1987) and Montgomery
(1991), informal networks are more important in generating job o⁄ers and accep-
tances than other formalized methods (such as job placement centers or newspaper
advertisements), for low-skilled labor markets. Therefore, it may be possible that
an increase on the education of the labor force could improve the e¢ cacy of the
matching process, decreasing the frictions in the labor market.
There are some papers that have analyzed the schooling and capital investments
decisions in labor markets characterized by search. Acemoglu (1996) shows how
the return to a worker can increase in the skill level of competing workers. Laing,Searching, Matching and Education: A Note 2
Palivos and Wang (1995) examine an endogenous growth model in which labor
market frictions are an integral part of the economic environment. Acemoglu
(1997) shows that in a frictional labor market, part of the productivity gains from
general training will be captured by future employers.
Our paper closely follows the paper of Laing, Palivos and Wang (1995), how-
ever we consider a framework where education of the workforce not only a⁄ects the
workers￿productivity, but also can improve the e¢ ciency of the matching process.
We utilize the ￿ matching and bargaining￿framework presented in Bagliano and
Bertola (2004), which combines elements of the well known work of P. Diamond,
D. Mortensen and C. Pissarides. Section 2 describes the basic economic environ-
ment, namely the educational sector and the labor market. In this section we also
present the assumptions concerning the matching function. Section 3 describes
the wage determination process and exploits the impact of the educational choices
undertaken by the workers on some labor market outcomes. Finally, section 4
concludes.
2. Basic environment
This section describes the economic environment. The economy is populated
by a continuum of identical agents, each possessing an identical instantaneous
discount rate over consumption of r. Workers are endowed with a unit of labor
which they can supply to ￿rms without disutility from e⁄ort. There are two
sectors: an educational sector and a frictional labor market, in which vacancies and
job-searching unemployed workers are brought together via a stochastic matching
technology.Searching, Matching and Education: A Note 3
2.1. The educational sector
Workers choose a level of schooling s, and their productivity is equal to their
knowledge ￿(s).
Assumption 1: The function ￿ : R+ ￿! [0;1] is strictly increasing, strictly con-
cave and twice di⁄erentiable in s, satisfying: lims￿!0 ￿(s) > 0 and lims￿!1 ￿(s) <
￿ < 1:
This assumption implies that there are diminishing returns to investment in
education with a boundary condition ruling out omniscience.
2.2. The labor market and the matching function
Once workers have completed their schooling, they enter the labor market,
become unemployed and search for employment. We de￿ne labor force as the sum
of the employed (E) workers plus the unemployed (U) workers which we assume to
be constant and equal to L units. Unemployed workers (U) and un￿lled vacancies
(V ) are brought together by a stochastic matching technology mL = A(s)m(U;V ),
which describes the instantaneous ￿ ow meeting rate between searching workers U,
and un￿lled vacancies V: The matching technology parameter A(s) captures the
e¢ ciency of the matching process, and we assume that is an increasing function
of the average education of the labor force.
Assumption 2: The function m, m : R2
+ ￿! R+ is strictly increasing, strictly
concave, twice continuously di⁄erentiable and constant-returns-to-scale function
of U and V , satisfying the Inada conditions (limj!0 mj = 1;limj!1 mj = 0;
j = U;V ) and the boundary conditions Lm(0;V ) = Lm(U;0) = 0:
An increase in U or V increases the instantaneous number of matches, but at a
diminishing rate. The CRS assumption follows the main ￿ndings of the empiricalSearching, Matching and Education: A Note 4
studies of the matching technology. Therefore, dividing both sides by L, we can
write m as m = A(s)m(u;v); where u = U=L denotes the unemployment rate and
v = V=L is the ratio between the number of vacancies and the total labor force.
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The severity of market frictions are represented by A(s), implying that an
increase in the average education level of the workforce skills leads to a more ef-
￿cient matching technology. This assumption is consistent with some empirical
studies that show that more skilled workers have more diverse sources of informa-
tion about job o⁄ers than less skilled workers (see Holzer (1987) and Montgomery
(1991)). Therefore, job searchers with any kind of schooling level bene￿t more
from interacting with more educated people, because these individuals have more
valuable information concerning non ￿lled vacancies.
3. Wage determination
3.1. Wage determination with exogenous schooling e⁄ort
We now will analyze the determination of the wage o⁄er function. The match
between a job-searcher worker and a vacancy will lead to a positive surplus toSearching, Matching and Education: A Note 5
be divided between the two parties, according to their relative bilateral strength
(exogenously given). Adopting the Nash bargaining assumption, we will assume
that the surplus appropriated by the worker in the wage negotiations is thus equal
to a fraction ￿ of the total surplus of the job. This surplus is equal to the di⁄erence
between the value that a ￿rm attributes to a vacancy (V ) and to a ￿lled job (J):
We can express these values as:
rV (t) = ￿c + A(s)q￿(￿(t))
￿





rJ(t) = [￿(s) ￿ w(t)] + d
￿














The ￿ ow return of the total surplus of the job is equal to the ￿ ow return of a ￿lled
job vacancy [￿(s) ￿ w(t) + c];which is equal to the ￿ ow output minus the wage
￿(s) ￿w(t) plus the saving of the cost of keeping a vacancy open c: To this, we
have to add the net capital loss, in case the job is destroyed (with probability d)
net of the capital gain in case the job is ￿lled with a worker, which occurs with
probability A(s)q￿(￿(t)).




V = 0 and due to free










and combining both expressions we have:
￿(s) = w(t) + (r + d)
c
A(s)q￿(￿)
: (7)Searching, Matching and Education: A Note 6
This equation means that the worker￿ s marginal productivity ￿(s) must com-
pensate the ￿rm for the wage w paid to the worker and for the ￿ ow cost of opening
a vacancy (r + d) c
A(s)q￿(￿): Note that this cost is decreasing in A(s); which means
that as the labor force becomes more educated, the wage paid by the ￿rm to the
worker approximates its competitive level, which is equal to his marginal produc-
tivity.
Similarly, we can express the ￿ ow return to a worker from accepting a job as
r(E￿U); where E and U denotes the value that a worker attributes to employment
and unemployment, respectively. Thus:
rE(t) = w(t) + d
￿





rU(t) = z + A(s)p￿(￿(t))
￿














where z represents the value of the unemployment bene￿ts or leisure.




U = 0; and keeping
the other parameters constant over time, the above equation gives:
E ￿ U =
w ￿ z
r + d + A(s)p￿(￿)
; (11)
which means that the surplus of the worker depends positively on the di⁄erence
w ￿ z; and negatively on the separation rate d; on the tightness of the labor
market ￿ and on s; the average schooling of the workforce. This means that an
increase on the instantaneous probability p that an unemployed worker ￿nds aSearching, Matching and Education: A Note 7
job, reduces the average length of an unemployment spell, decreasing the surplus
of the employment to the worker.
By the Nash bargaining assumption, we know that
E ￿ U = ￿ [(J ￿ V ) + (E ￿ U)]; (12)
which means that the surplus appropriated by the worker is a fraction ￿ of the
total surplus. Therefore, using 11 and 6 and the above equation, we can obtain
the following expression for the wage:
w = z + ￿(￿(s) + c￿ ￿ z): (13)
The wage is the sum of the unemployment bene￿ts or leisure z, plus the fraction
￿ of the total surplus of a ￿lled job ￿(s) + c￿ ￿ z. It is important to note that
education a⁄ects the equilibrium wage only through the worker productivity ￿(s)
and not through the e¢ ciency of the matching process, because the e⁄ect of the
average education on E ￿ U cancels out with the e⁄ect on J ￿ V .
3.2. Wage determination with endogenous schooling e⁄ort
We now consider the optimal choice of education by workers in the economic
environment described above. Investment in education raises the worker￿ s stock of
human capital, and therefore their productivity, but is a costly decision in terms
of its e⁄ort disutility or direct pecuniary costs. Let k(s) denote the utility cost
to workers to acquire the level s of schooling. We assume that the function k is
strictly increasing, twice continuously di⁄erentiable and convex in s. Note that
once workers have completed their schooling, they enter the labor market, become
unemployed, and search for employment. Therefore each individual, taking theSearching, Matching and Education: A Note 8
matching parameters ￿; ￿ and A(s) as given, has to solve the following optimization
problem:
Max [U ￿ k(s)]:




r(r + d + A(s)p￿(￿))
￿
[(r + d)z + A(s)p￿(￿)w]; (14)






























Individuals invest in education in order to increase their productivity ￿(s) and
hence their wage once employed. Factors which in￿ uence wage income (z; ￿; c or
￿) or matching probabilities alter workers schooling e⁄ort.
The average level of education of the workforce also a⁄ects the individual







r(r+d+A(s)p￿(￿)) = 1=r; which means that without frictions











which simply says that the optimal amount of schooling s￿ is the one that equates
the discounted total marginal wage income to the marginal cost of schooling
@k(s)




r(r+d+A(s)p￿(￿)) = 0; which means that there are no matches
in the economy, and therefore individuals do not invest in their own education.
Thus there exists a strategic complementarity between workers in this economy: an
increase in the education of the others increases the marginal return of education
of the worker, who will respond to this by raising his own educational level. The
existence of multiple equilibria requires the condition @s
￿
@s > 1, which depends
on features of the function A(s): In this case, government can act as a ￿ market-
maker￿ , and keep the economy away from ￿ poor￿equilibria, characterized by a low
schooling e⁄ort and an ine¢ cient labor market.
Average education also a⁄ects the unemployment level: from the steady state
relationship between unemployment rate and A(s)p￿(￿); u = d=[d + A(s)p￿(￿)];
we can infer that as s increases, u decreases, because the unemployment spells
become shorter.
As in Laing et al (1995), our results show that an increase in the average
education of the labor force not only promotes their productivity, but also miti-
gates market frictions. As market frictions decrease, new generations of workers
have more incentive to undertake schooling, which can raise the growth rate and
decreasing unemployment.
4. Conclusion
In this paper we try to understand how education choices interact with wages
and unemployment determination in a frictional labor market, where matching is
not perfect. The individual optimal level of education is shown to be a function of
the search frictions and on the educational choices of the others. An increase in the
average education can improve economic e¢ ciency, not only through improvementsSearching, Matching and Education: A Note 10
in workers productivity, but also by making the matching process more e¢ cient,
and thus reducing the unemployment level.
There are many possible ways to expand this work. First, one interesting possi-
bility is to more thoroughly explore the conditions under which multiple equilibria
can occur. Secondly, a more dynamic framework might be considered, analyzing
the case in which the stock of human capital grows, not only through education,
but also through the worker￿ s labor market experience. This would help us to
better understand these channels of educational externalities, and give theoretical
support to empirical analysis.
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